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-In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STANTON TRANSPORTATION COM-
P ANY, a corporation, Plaintiff, 
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMPANY, a 
division of YOUNGSTOWN SHEET 
AND TUBE COMPANY, a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff 
and Cross Appellant, Case No. 
8950 
MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS, JEAN 
DAVIS and JOAN PRESTON, partners, 
doing business under the firm name of 
DAVIS OIL COMPANY, 
Defendants 
and Cross Respondents. 
BRIEF OF CROSS RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The cross appeal of Continental Emsco Company is from 
the judgment of the trial court that items other than rock bits 
furnished to the driller, such as chisels, pipe wrenches, punches, 
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bolts, washers, putty knives, sledge hammer handles, screw 
drivers, hatchets, etc., and other items set out in the Exhibits 
which the court found were not consumed in the drilling of the 
well and therefor are not lienable. (TRB 114). 
STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED ON 
POINT I 
MATERIALS FURNISHED TO A DRILLING CON-
TRACTOR IN THE NATURE OF REMOVABLE PER-
SONAL PROPERTY ARE NOT LIENABLE UNDER THE 
UTAH STATUTES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MATERIALS FURNISHED TO A DRILLING CON-
TRACTOR IN THE NATURE OF REMOVABLE PER-
SONAL PROPERTY ARE NOT LIENABLE UNDER THE 
UTAH STATUTES. 
Cross Appellant Continental Emsco Company in its cross 
appeal cites one case as authority for its position, namely, 
William M. Graham Gas and Oil Co. v. Oil Well Supply Co., 
128 Okl. 201, 264 Pac. 591. This case clearly is not applicable 
because the materials and supplies referred to therein were 
furnished to the owner of the leasehold on a definite contract 
for payment. In the case at bar, the materials for which a lien 
is claimed were not sold to the owner of the leasehold but 
were sold to the drilling contractor and the credit was extended 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to him. In the case of Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., 133 F2d 
512, 5 Cir ., ( 1943), the court, in footnote No. 7, referred to 
the William M. Graham Oil and Gas Co. case, supra., as 
follows: 
110klahoma seems to stand solitary and alone in 
rejecting this view. William W. Graham Oil & Cas Co. 
v. Oil U? .. ell Supply Co., 128 Okl. 201, 264 P. 591, 
overruling Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 
Okla. 77, 249 P. 717. It must be noted, however, that 
in the Graham case, the liened materials were materials, 
machinery and supplies normally used or consumed 
< in the drilling of a well, were furnished to the owner 
on a definite contract for payment, and that that case 
is not authority for the claim made here that a rig 
sold to a contractor as a part of his plant is lienable 
against the owner." 
On page 20 of Cross Appellant's brief the applicable 
Oklahoma statute is quoted verbatim. This statute is in nowise 
comparable to the Utath statute. The Oklahoma statute pro-
vides that "any person, corporation or co-partnership, who, 
shall, under contract express or implied, with the owner of 
any leasehold for oil or gas purposes, or the owner of any 
gas pipe line or oil pipe line or with the trustee or agent of 
such owner, perform labor or furnish materials, machinery, 
and oil well supplies used in the digging, drilling, torpedoing, 
completing, operating or repair of any gas well, shall have a 
lien upon the whole of such leasehold ... for which materialJ 
and supplies were furnished." The Oklahoma statute includes 
materials and supplies, whereas the Utah statute does not. In 
the Utah statute the word materials is used, but the word 
supplies does not appear. That the two words are not synon-
ymous is clearly indicated in the following decisions: Willett 
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v. Davis (Washington) 193 P2d 321, 329, where the court 
said: 
"We have always held that, within the purview of 
Rem. Rev. Stat., Sec. 729, the rental of equipment is 
neither labor performed nor materials furnished. Hall 
v. Cowen, 51 Wash. 295, 98 Pac. 670; Hurley-Mason 
Co. v. American Bonding Co., 79 Wash. 564, 140 Pac. 
5 75. On the other hand, we are fully aware that 
equipment rental is lienable as rsupplies' within the 
purview of Rem. Rev. Stat. Sec. 1159 * * * ." 
and the case of Clayton v. Bridgeport Machine Co., 33 SW2d 
787, where the court stated: 
"Another question presented is whether a lien is 
given by the statute to secure the price or value of the 
rental of drilling tools. * * * Were the lien given 
only to secure labor and material, we would incline 
to the view that it would not cover the rental of tools. 
* * * The statute, however, also authorizes a lien to 
secure payment of machinery and supplies so fur-
nished and used. We will not stop to inquire if the 
tools in question may properly be regarded as ma-
chinery. We think that tools such as these which are 
customarily used in the drilling of oil or gas wells 
under rental contract are supplies within the terms 
of the statute.'' 
As to the lienability of the materials sold, we believe the 
correct rule is stated in the case of Given v. Campbell, 127 Kan. 
3 78, 273 Pac. 442: 
"Now, it is perfectly obvious that if this well were 
drilled to completion, these articles would not become 
fixtures of the leasehold. They would constitute no 
part of the improvement of the property. They will 
be carried away and used on a second and third drilling 
job, and so on until they are worn out. Should appellee's 
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leasehold be subject to a lien for the payment of this 
rope, belt, wrench, hammer, pail, sand line and drill-
ing line? If so, will plaintiffs' leasehold alone be 
subject to a lien therefore, or will all the leaseholds 
in the community on which these chattels are success-
ively used until they are worn out be likewise sub-
jected to appellant's lien claim for their payment? 
Why should a vendor's lien be granted on an interest 
in reality for the price of a wrench, a hammer, or a 
water pail purchased for the use of the driller of an 
oil and gas well when no such lien was granted for 
the purchase price of a carpenter's hammer, a plumber's 
wrench, or a plasterer's water pail similarly used in 
the construction of any other improvement in realty? 
* * * " 
To the same effect see Albuquerque Foundry & Machin-
ery Works v. Stone (N.M.) 286 Pac. 157. 
(All emphasis appearing herein has been added.) 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANTHONY F. ZARLENGO 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Cross Respondents 
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